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The differential impact of real interest rates  
and credit availability on private investment:  
evidence from Venezuela 
Omar A Mendoza Lugo
1 
1. Introduction 
Private spending on fixed capital goods has been an important topic of discussion among 
economists and policy makers. The influence of investment on growth and its volatility 
contributing to business cycles justify this focus. Recent empirical research has evaluated 
the effects of economic reforms, especially financial reforms, on capital formation and growth 
in developing countries. This issue sheds light on the link between financial and real 
variables. In traditional theory, this link is given by means of the real interest rate. However, 
credit may also have a direct effect on real variables by affecting consumption and 
investment when asymmetric information and/or excessive government intervention 
characterize the financial market. 
In the 1970’s, some economists, led by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), began to argue 
in favor of financial liberalization as a medium of promoting saving, investment, and growth. 
This was based on the argument that real interest rates are frequently negative in developing 
countries due to administrative controls on the nominal interest rates and heavy regulation in 
the financial market. This argument implies that real interest rates have a net positive effect 
on private investment, contradicting the traditional view of a negative relationship between 
private investment and real interest rates. Nevertheless, the financial liberalization literature 
argues in favor of higher interest rates due to what was observed in developing economies at 
the time, and the possibility of a negative relationship between investment and interest rates 
was not ruled out. McKinnon (1973) argued that in those countries where self-finance is very 
important and the interest rate is negative or very low, an upward increase in real deposit 
rates encourages saving (the substitution effect dominates the income effect) and the 
substitution from goods to bank deposits. Both have positive effects on private investment 
because self-financed investment rises and because there is a rise in the availability of funds 
to finance any profitable investment project. However, at higher rates, economic agents 
would prefer to hold deposits that yield a higher return than investment in physical capital. 
Therefore, at high rates, investment and real bank rates are expected to be negatively 
related. Hence, McKinnon’s arguments imply a nonlinear relationship between real interest 
rates and private investment. 
Furthermore, private investment can be nonlinear in credit availability (Günçavdı et al (1998)). 
That is, if we expect that credit constraints are present at all levels of interest rates, then 
when the effect of an increase in the real interest rates in the loan supply is higher than the 
costs brought about by higher rates due to asymmetric information problems, a decrease in 
the sensitivity of private investment on credit availability at higher rates should be expected 
as well. 
Investigating the effects of financial factors on private investment, especially the role of 
interest rates, constitutes an important issue for developing countries where economic 
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authorities in general believe that real interest rates play an important role in investment 
decisions and therefore on growth. In particular, the current Venezuelan government 
emphasizes the need to lower interest rates to encourage private investment. However, 
Venezuela is one of the countries that has maintained, on average, low real interest rates in 
recent years (see Mendoza Lugo (2001), Appendix A, Tables A.1 and A.2), with long periods 
of negative real rates and with periods of administrative control and decontrol on the nominal 
interest rates.  
To investigate the nonlinear relationship and, therefore, the differential impact of real interest 
rates and credit availability on private investment, we use Venezuelan quarterly data for the 
period 1983:1–2000:4. The variables used in this study, besides private investment, are bank 
lending real interest rates, bank loans to the private sector as an indicator of credit 
availability, public investment and real gross domestic output generated by the private sector 
or private GDP. All these variables are, in principle, treated as endogenous, but the main 
focus is given to private investment spending. In addition to the mentioned variables, some 
dummy variables are taken into account to control for special events, structural economic 
reform and seasonality. Since we are interested in a model specification where the variable 
defining the states of the economy is known, the proposed econometric model is a logistic 
smooth transition vector error correction (LSTVEC) model, which is a generalization of the 
smooth transition regressive (STR) models proposed by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993).
2 
We estimate a LSTVEC model for private investment and its determinants with lagged values 
of DLCREDIT explaining the states of the economy in four of the five equations considered in 
this study.
3 To estimate the LSTVEC model, we use as a benchmark a linear specification, 
namely a subset or restricted in coefficients VEC model, and follow, with some modifications, 
the procedure recommended by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) to estimate a STR model. 
From the LSTVEC model, generalized impulse response functions are constructed (Koop 
et al (1996), Weise (1999)) to explore, especially, the effects of positive and negative shocks 
to the real interest rate and credit availability on private investment when facing credit 
contractions or expansions. The impulse responses show evidence for asymmetric effects of 
shocks of the growth rate of these financial variables to the growth rate of private investment. 
However, these asymmetries are not totally in line with the predictions of the financial 
liberalization theory. 
Section 2 summarizes some theoretical issues and empirical evidence reported in the 
literature with special focus on developing countries. However, it is not our purpose to 
present an exhaustive survey of the literature, but merely present a review of results of 
previous research that support and allow for comparison to the results of this research. 
Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 introduces a smooth transition specification for a 
VEC  model with special emphasis on the modeling of a nonlinear private investment 
function. Section 5 is related to the estimation procedure and presents the results. Section 6 
shows the impulse response functions on the growth rate of private investment (DLPRIVINV) 
to shocks on the five endogenous variables considered in the study. Finally, Section 7 
presents the conclusions. 
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2.  On the determinants of private investment in developing countries 
Some economists argue that when studying investment in developing countries, special 
features not accounted for in traditional theories of investment should be considered. Agénor 
and Montiel (1999, pp 97–99) list six of those factors. First, financial variables may influence 
private investment because of underdeveloped financial systems and financial repression. 
Second, foreign exchange rationing and the exchange rate in the free market may influence 
investment decisions because of the importance of imported capital goods. Third, due to their 
importance in the production process in developing countries, imported intermediate goods 
should be taken into account in the specification of relative prices. Fourth, debt overhang 
inhibits investment because of the possibility of higher taxes to finance future debt service. 
Fifth, public investment has played an important role in the process of capital formation in 
developing countries. It may have a positive or negative effect on private investment 
depending on whether public investment is complementary to or a substitute for private 
investment. And sixth, macroeconomic instability and its resulting uncertainty, which have 
characterized developing countries, may have an important effect on private investment. 
Despite the understanding that all these elements may be important determinants of 
investment, the present study focuses on the first and fifth issues; that is, this research is 
basically limited to the role of financial factors, credit availability and interest rates as 
determinants of private investment. Public investment is considered in the analysis because 
it may affect private investment by means of its effects on financial variables as well as its 
direct effect by means of positive externalities enhancing the productivity of the private 
sector. In addition, gross domestic product and economic reform policies are taken into 
account because they have been found in previous research to be important determinants of 
private investment. Further, these two variables might play an important role in 
understanding private investment spending in the presence of asymmetric information and 
the transition from a heavily regulated economy to a more market-oriented economy. 
2.1  Real interest rates as a determinant of private investment 
The effect of real interest rates on private investment spending was first formalized in an 
investment equation by Jorgenson (1963), who derived the desired stock of capital as a 
function of real output and the opportunity cost of capital. In this approach, known as the 
neoclassical approach, a representative firm maximizes the present value of its future cash 
flows. The desired capital stock is directly related to output and inversely related to the cost 
of capital. A decrease in the real interest rate lowers the opportunity cost of capital and, 
therefore, raises the desired capital stock and investment spending. 
Other literature, emphasizing the role of financial markets on capital formation (McKinnon 
(1973); Shaw (1973); Fry (1988)) includes suggestions that an increase in real interest rates 
has a positive effect on the volume and on the quality of investment in financially repressed 
economies.
4 The former effect is seen because self-finance is important and investment is 
lumpy. Then, the economic agents must accumulate resources before any investment project 
is executed. An increase in real interest rates thus stimulates both total and financial savings 
and, consequently, investment. The latter effect, improvement in the quality of investment, 
occurs because a higher interest rate will rule out investment projects with low productivity. 
At the same time, higher rates move resources from less efficient (eg goods facing some 
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depreciation) to more efficient forms of accumulation (eg bank deposits with a more 
favorable return).
5 
In particular, McKinnon (1973), when explaining the link between interest rates, money and 
investment, suggests a nonlinear relationship between the real interest rates on deposits and 
the rate of private investment. When the real return to money is lower than the average real 
return to physical capital, a further increase in money returns induces the accumulation of 
cash balances to finance a significant number of investment projects. But at higher interest 
rates, more economic agents may prefer to hold money rather than finance investment 
projects because money offers a higher return than their investment possibilities in physical 
capital. Therefore, one expects to find a positive (negative) relationship between these two 
variables at low (high) returns holding the average return to physical capital constant.  
McKinnon’s investment equation is given by 
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. Where I denotes private investment, Y is output, r is 
the average return on physical capital, d is the real return on money, and the last derivative 
expresses the nonlinear relationship between real interest rates for money and the rate of 
investment. 
Warman and Thirlwall (1994) study the effects of real interest rates on saving, investment 
and growth. They use data from Mexico for the period 1960–90 to quantify the level effects of 
low and high interest rates on private investment. They use the following investment 
equation. 
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e  
where b1>0, c1<0, d1>0, d2>0. 
They specify investment (I) as a function of the real interest rate (r), credit to the private 
sector (C), the first difference of GDP (∆GDP), and a term, (r–r
e)*D, to capture the non-
linearity between interest rates and private investment. r
e is the threshold rate or the border 
rate between two regimes in which the interest rate affects investment in different (positive 
and negative) ways. D is a dummy variable taking values of one when r–r
e is positive and 
zero otherwise.  
Under the above specification, Warman and Thirlwall find that the coefficients for interest 
rates and for the term measuring nonlinearity are very low and statistically insignificant. 
When a linear relationship is assumed, the real interest rate has an important negative and 
statistically significant effect on private investment. However, they may have failed to find a 
nonlinear relationship between the real interest rate and investment because of a 
misspecified nonlinear investment equation. 
A further study of the nonlinearity of investment in financial factors is provided by Günçavdı 
et al (1998). They argue that after financial liberalization, the investment equation should 
become more sensitive to the cost of capital and less sensitive to the flow of credit to the 
private sector because of the relaxation of the credit constraints. Based on the fact that after 
financial liberalization the real interest rate became positive in Turkey, Günçavdı et al test for 
structural changes in the coefficients for cost of capital and credit availability in an estimated 
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private investment equation for Turkey. They find that the sensitivity of private investment on 
credit availability decreases after financial liberalization but they do not find evidence for an 
increase in the sensitivity of investment on the cost of capital.
6 
Furthermore, some economists argue that when analyzing the effect of interest rate policies 
in developing countries, the assumption of perfect competition in the banking system is 
unrealistic because in these countries the banking sector is characterized by a small number 
of banks. In addition, credit markets face asymmetric information. For example, Demetriades 
and Luintel (2001) argue that under imperfect competition, mild repression
7 in the lending 
rates has a positive effect on bank loans. That is, under government intervention with an 
interest rate fixed below the monopoly equilibrium level, it is optimal for bankers to increase 
the amount of loans. However, repressing interest rate levels below those that would prevail 
under perfect competition will likely reduce the amount of loans and consequently have a 
negative effect in the economy. 
Data on interest rates is only available since the eighties or early nineties for most of 
developing countries; therefore there is not an abundance of empirical work testing the 
effects of interest rates or the cost of capital on private investment for developing countries. 
Previous work for developing countries is not only sparse but also shows mixed results for 
the effect of interest rates on investment spending. For instance, Warman and Thirlwall 
(1994) show a negative and significant relationship using data for Mexico. De Melo and 
Tybout (1986) report a negative but statistically insignificant effect using data for Uruguay. 
Laumas (1990) and Athukorala (1998) find a positive relationship between real interest on 
deposits and private investment in India. With respect to the relationship between the cost of 
capital and investment, the relation is found to be negative in Athukorala (1998) but positive 
in Günçavdı et al (1998) for Turkey. 
2.2  Bank lending as a determinant of private investment 
When studying developing countries, bank lending to the private sector is an important 
determinant of private investment due to the banking system’s importance as a source of 
external finance in those countries. That is, bank loans do not have close substitutes. 
Therefore, a contraction in the bank supply of credit may limit spending financed by credit. If 
the supply of bank credit is limited by the size of deposits, then a contraction of deposits will 
contract the supply of credit. 
The financial repression literature, or the literature in favor of financial liberalization, takes the 
special role of the banking system as a source of finance in developing countries into 
account. When administrative controls are imposed on interest rates, credit is not allocated 
according to the expected return on the projects, but according to the quality of collateral, 
loan size, political pressure, and covert benefits to loan officers. With interest rate ceilings, 
financial institutions do not take risk because higher interest rates cannot be charged. 
Consequently, many high-yielding projects may face credit rationing (Fry (1988), page 18). 
An increase in real interest rates encourages deposits and, hence, increases the availability 
of funds to the private sector to finance investment projects while deterring low-yield projects. 
In contrast, the theory emphasizing the role of asymmetric information in financial markets 
predicts that an increase in interest rates causes credit rationing because the lenders’ 
expected profitability is not monotonically increasing in interest rates. At higher rates, lenders 
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may experience a decrease in profits due to adverse selection, moral hazard, and monitoring 
costs. Therefore, lenders are not willing to lend at a rate higher than that which maximizes 
their expected profits, even though there are agents willing to borrow at that higher rate (see, 
for instance, Walsh (1998), Chapter 7).
8 
The opposite predictions of these two literatures do not imply that they exclude each other. If 
we interpret the type of constraint predicted by the financial liberalization theory as more 
closely related to price rationing than a credit constraint, then both effects might be present in 
an economy. That is, higher interest rates may lead to higher credit availability but, for a 
given amount of credit, some firms may have access to bank loans and others may not. This 
would imply that credit constraints might be present not only at low interest rates, but also at 
high interest rates. If both causes of credit constraints exist, then it is expected that credit 
availability will have a direct effect on private investment at both high and low interest rates. 
At the empirical level, if the finding is that credit availability affects investment only when 
interest rates are low, this will be an indicator of financial restraints and shed light in favor of 
higher interest rates to encourage investment. If credit availability also enters into the 
investment equation at high interest rates, then the sensitivity of investment to credit 
availability would depend on the net effect of interest rates on credit. That is, lenders may be 
willing to lend more if the effect of an increase of interest rates on deposits is higher than the 
cost brought about by the asymmetric information problem. If this were the case, we would 
expect a decrease in the sensitivity of investment on credit availability at higher interest 
rates. This suggests a nonlinear relationship between credit allocated to the private sector 
and private investment. 
Previous empirical studies have generally found a positive and statistically significant effect 
of credit availability (net flow of credit to the private sector) on private investment. Oshikoya 
(1994) finds that credit to the private sector has a significant positive effect on private 
investment in middle and low income African countries.
9 Shafik (1992) reports both short- 
and long-term positive and significant relationships between private investment and credit 
allocated to the private sector using data for Egypt. Leff and Sato (1988), using data for 21 
Latin American countries, found, in general, a positive relationship between private 
investment and the change in total real credit. Ramirez (2000) also found a positive 
coefficient for the lagged ratio of credit to the private sector to gross domestic product (GDP) 
in an equation for the private investment-GDP ratio for eight Latin American countries.
10 
There is also evidence of financial development causing investment and growth. For 
instance, Bell and Rousseau (2001), using data for India, find that credit allocated to the 
private sector, and two other broader financial indicators,
11 Granger cause aggregate 
investment and output without evidence of feedback. 
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2.3  Public investment as a determinant of private investment 
In developing countries, the government has played an important role in capital formation. 
That is, public investment constitutes an important portion of total investment. Thus, 
evaluating the effect of this expenditure on private investment decisions may be worthwhile. 
According to theory, the effect of public investment on private investment is indeterminate. 
Public investment can act as a substitute (negative effect on private investment) to or a 
complement (positive effect on) for private investment. The sign of the effect depends on the 
area in which the government executes the investment projects. Public investment may 
encourage private investment when such expenditure contributes to increasing private-
owned firms’ productivity. On the other hand, it may crowd out private investment when: 
(i) the government invests in inefficient state-owned firms; (ii) private investors expect higher 
taxes to finance such expenditures; and/or (iii) the public sector competes with the private 
sector for domestic loanable funds.
12 
Empirical studies on this issue report contrasting results for both developing and developed 
countries.
13 Oshikoya (1994) finds a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
private and public investment in middle income African countries. Paradoxically, this effect is 
weak or negative in low income countries. Recently, Apergis (2000) evaluated the effect of 
public spending (consumption and investment) on Greece for the period 1948–96. He found 
that for early years both variables are positively cointegrated. However, for a more recent 
sub-period, 1981–96, the cointegration relationship between those variables is negative. 
Ramirez (2000) finds a positive relationship between public and private investment in eight 
Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and 
Uruguay) for the period 1980–95. Cardoso (1993) found a similar result with data for six Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela) using a 
panel comprising information for three sub-periods between 1970 and 1985.
14 
Separating public investment into infrastructure and non-infrastructure investment, some 
empirical studies have found evidence of a positive relationship between public investment in 
infrastructure and private investment. By contrast, the effect of government spending on non-
infrastructure has a negative effect on private investment (see, for instance, Blejer and 
Mohsin (1984)). Pereira (2000) reports that five types of total public investment have a 
positive effect on private investment and output in the US for the period 1956–97 using a four 
variable VAR in first difference.
15 Due to the type of spending considered,
16 the result is 
consistent with the view that public investment in infrastructure tends to encourage private 
activity by means of a rise in private sector productivity.
17 
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15   The VAR contains the first difference of the logarithm of private investment, private employment, private GDP, 
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2.4  On the other determinants of private investment
18 
In addition to the determinants mentioned above, private investment spending depends on 
output, economic reform policy, and on its owned lagged values. Since the early study of 
Clark (1917), the change in output is considered as a determinant of investment spending. 
This effect is the well known “accelerator effect”. Output also plays an important role in the 
neoclassical approach of investment introduced by Jorgenson (1963), although the central 
feature of this theory is to evaluate the effects of relative prices on the demand for capital. 
Output affects investment decisions due to its effect on firms’ profitability and also by means 
of the output-saving-aggregate investment channel.
19 Empirical results usually confirm a 
strong and positive effect of changes in GDP on private investment or GDP growth on the 
investment-GDP ratio. 
Moreover, recent empirical studies for developing countries have found evidence for 
important changes in the investment equation due to economic reform. For instance, Fielding 
(1997) evaluates the impacts of policy reform in six African countries (Kenya, Nigeria, 
Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, and Mauritius) and finds evidence for economic reform 
altering the investment equation. Also, Athukorala (1998) finds that market-oriented reforms 
positively affected the private investment function in India. Other empirical researchers have 
found evidence of the impact of financial reforms on private investment. In general, this line 
of research tests for structural changes in the parameters of the investment function. For 
example, Günçavdi et al (1998) and De Melo and Tybout (1986) test for structural breaks in 
the investment equation after financial liberalization policies were implemented in Turkey and 
Uruguay. 
3. Data 
The data cover the period 1983:1–1999:4. In Section 2, we discussed the determinants of 
private investment considered in this research. For empirical implementation, those 
variables, except for the real interest rate, are transformed into natural logarithms. These 
variables are denoted as follows: 
v = LPRIVINV or the logarithm of real private investment spending; 
w = DLCREDIT or first difference of logarithm of real stock of credit to the private sector; 
x = RIQ or the real bank lending interest rate; 
y = LPRIVGDP or logarithm of private GDP; and 
z = LPUBINV or logarithm of public investment. 
Data for GDP and investment have been provided by the econometrics department 
(Departamento de Apoyo Cuantitativo) of the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV). Data on the 
nominal stock of credit to the private sector are obtained from the IMF, International financial 
statistics, CD-R April 2001. The real stock of credit is the nominal stock of credit deflated by 
the consumer price index (CPI). Investment (total, public, and private), GDP, and the real 
stock of credit are expressed in billions of bolivares and in 1984 prices. The natural logarithm 
transformation is applied to those variables as well. 
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What matters for investment spending in period t is the amount of funds available in that 
period rather than the credit stock. Credit allocated to the private sector in real terms should 
be measured by means of the first difference of the nominal stock of credit deflated by the 
price index. This takes into account not only the change in the real stock of credit but also the 
replacement of the stock due to inflation. However, when the series are transformed into 
logarithms there is an important loss of information because the logarithm is not defined for 
negative numbers. Nevertheless, in this research, the indicator for credit availability is 
obtained as the first difference of the logarithm of real stock of credit. 
Furthermore, the real interest rate in quarterly terms is constructed from monthly data on 
nominal lending interest rates from the six most important banks, and the CPI is provided by 
the BCV. See Mendoza Lugo (2001, Appendix A) for details on the procedure used in the 
calculation of the real interest rate series. In Venezuela, the public sector constitutes an 
important proportion of total GDP. It represents 37.5% of total GDP throughout the period 
under analysis. Therefore, it seems better to use GDP generated by the private sector rather 
than total GDP as a determinant of private investment. Private GDP for 1983:1–1990:3 is 
calculated by interpolation based on proportions of private GDP to total GDP using annual 
data obtained from Antivero (1992), Tables II-8 and II-9, and the quarterly total GDP for the 
same period obtained from the BCV. That is, the proportion of private GDP to total GDP is 
obtained from annual data and the four observations of quarterly total GDP for each year are 
multiplied by this proportion. The computed new series is used as the indicator of private 
GDP.  
The series used in this research are intentionally left seasonally unadjusted. Even though 
much empirical work uses seasonally adjusted data, some time series analysts suggest 
working with seasonally unadjusted data because: (i) seasonally adjusted data may lead to 
misleading inferences about the relationship among the variables; and (ii) seasonal 
adjustments imply a loss of important information when seasonal fluctuations explain an 
important part of the behavior of the variables in analysis (see for instance, Lee (1992), Lee 
and Siklos (1997), and Bohl (2000)). Thus, the data is tested for unit roots at all frequencies 
(seasonal and long-run) using the HEGY (Hylleberg, Engle, Granger, and Yoo) test for unit 
roots, which allows discrimination of unit roots at long-run, semiannual, and annual 
frequencies. Also, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips and Perron (PP) 
test are performed for comparison purposes. The PP test is applied in this research only 
when the residuals from the ADF regression are hereroskedastic as reported by the Q 
statistic on the square of the residuals. The HEGY test indicates that the Venezuelan data in 
this research does not have seasonal unit roots. While at the long-run frequency, unit roots 
are found for LPRIVGDP, LPRIVINV, and LPUBINV. Results and discussion about unit root 
tests are reported in Mendoza Lugo ((2001), Appendix B). 
4.  Modeling a nonlinear private investment function 
The literature offers a wide variety of nonlinear models. Among the nonlinear parametric 
specifications, the smooth transition regression (STR) models and the threshold regression 
(TR) models have recently been increasingly used in modeling economic relationships. 
However, since the TR models are a particular case of the STR models, it is convenient to 
start investigating a nonlinear relationship with the STR models to avoid specification 
problems.  
The smooth transition models belong to the category of regime switching models and are 
introduced in the literature in their autoregressive (STAR) version by Chan and Tong (1986); 
Luukkonen, Saikkonen, and Teräsvirta (1988); Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992); and 510  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
Teräsvirta (1994). Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) extend the STAR models to a multivariate 
context resulting in the STR models.
20 
4.1  A smooth transition specification for private investment within a VEC model 
We model a nonlinear specification for private investment within a smooth transition vector 
error correction (STVEC) model in which private investment depends on its own lagged 
values and on the lags of other variables determining investment. In other words, it is 
claimed that if a linear specification for private investment is rejected, then there exists a 
nonlinear dynamic that is appropriately described by an STR model. The STR models, in 
addition to offering a less restrictive framework, are recommended when analyzing 
aggregates as in the case of private investment spending (Granger and Teräsvirta (1993, 
page 40)). That is, at the micro level the decisions to invest may be constrained to “invest 
given a state of the economy, say state or regime 1” or “do not invest given state or regime 
2”. However, at the macro level the lack of coordination among individual decisions may lead 
to a smooth transition from one regime to the other.  
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where, 
D is a (n0 x 1) matrix of deterministic terms, X is a (n x 1) vector, n is the number of 
endogenous variables;  i , 0 π  i = 1,2, is a (n x no) vector of coefficients for the ith regime, and 
i π and  i m, θ  are (nxn) matrices of coefficients. The rank of  i , 0 π ,  r, is the number of 
cointegrating vectors. The matrix  i , 0 π  can be expressed as  i i i i γ α γ = π ; , 0  and  i α  are (n x r) 
matrices with rank r. The former is the matrix containing the adjustment coefficients and the 
latter is the matrix of cointegrating vectors. In the estimation procedure, we assume 
α = α = α 2 1 ;  t Χ α  is the cointegrating vector (CIVt) for both regimes.  2 , 0 π  is a matrix of zeros 
the coefficient denoting the constant term. That is, the model is lineal in determinist variables 
the constant term. In addition,  t ΔΧ  = [dvt, dwt, dxt, dyt, dzt] and F(TVt–d) is the indicator or 
transition function taking values between zero and one, both extremes, inclusive. When 
taking intermediate values, it allows a smooth transition between regimes. In general, 
() d t TV F −  is specified by one of the following two forms: 
0 , )]} ( [ 1 { ) (
1 > γ − γ − + =
−
− − c TV Exp TV F d t d t  (4.2) 
or 
0 , } )] ( [ { 1 ) (
2 > γ − γ − − = − − c TV Exp TV F d t d t  (4.3) 
                                                  
20  The smooth transition models have been applied to explain the dynamic behavior of some macroeconomic 
variables. For instance, Weise (1999) tests for asymmetric effects of monetary policy in the United States 
using a logistic smooth transition vector autoregression (LSTVAR) model. Taylor and Peel (2000) find that the 
exponential smooth transition autoregressive (ESTAR) model explains the behavior of the deviations of the 
dollar-mark and dollar-sterling exchange rates from the long-run equilibrium rate. Sarantis (1999) finds that 
STAR models approximate the nonlinearity in the effective real exchange rate for eight of the G10 countries. 
Byers and Peel (2000) model the hyperinflation in Germany, Brazil, and Argentina using the ESTAR model. 
Other recent applications of smooth transition models are in Chen and Wu (2000), Öcal and Osborn (2000), 
van Dijk and Franses (1999), Lutkepohl et al (1999), Leybourne and Mizen (1999), Bradley and Jansen 
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These are the logistic and the exponential transition or indicator functions. Notice that the 
indicator function has been restricted to contain only one transition variable. This is 
equivalent to assuming that the transition variable, TV, and the delay parameter, d, are 
known. A model combining (4.1) and (4.2) is a logistic smooth transition vector error 
correction (LSTVEC) model. When using (4.1) and (4.3), the model is the exponential 
smooth transition vector error correction (ESTVEC) model. The LSTVEC model allows the 
VEC to behave differently when the transition variable takes low values. That is, two regimes 
can be defined: the low regime and the high regime. The ESTVEC models, instead, assume 
that the VEC behaves the same when the transition variable takes extreme values. This 
behavior differs from when the transition variable takes values located in the middle of its 
own range of values. In this case the two regimes are called the outer regime and the middle 
regime. 
In the logistic function, when () c TV d t − −  is large and positive,  () [ ] c TV Exp d t − − − γ  tends to 
zero and the transition function takes a value of one. In the opposite case, 
() [] c TV Exp d t − − − γ  tends to infinity and the transition function goes to zero. Therefore, in the 
low regime, the estimated regression is given by the set of estimated coefficients in the first 
and second terms of (4.1). While in the high regime, the whole set of estimated coefficients 
for all terms in (4.1) describe the dynamics of investment or the variable being analyzed. In 
the case of the exponential function, when ( ) c TV d t − −  takes either large positive or negative 
values,  () [] { }
2 c TV Exp d t − − − γ  tends to zero and the transition function takes a value of one. 
Thus, this function restricts the dynamics of the equation to be the same when the transition 
variable takes extreme values. When  d t TV −  takes values close to c,  () [] { }
2 c TV Exp d t − − − γ  
tends to one and the transition function goes to zero. 
Between the logistic and the exponential transition functions, we have chosen the logistic 
function to investigate nonlinearities in the VEC. This choice is based on the theory 
discussed previously. 
4.2  The choice of transition variable 
The search for a transition variable will be done focused on possible nonlinearities in the 
VEC model due to nonlinearities in the private investment equation.
21 We suspect that the 
investment equation behaves differently when the interest rate takes high as opposed to low 
values. It could also be that the investment equation behaves differently when there is a 
credit constraint and when constraints are relaxed. One additional possibility is that whether 
the economy is expanding or contracting could define the state of the world or regime. That 
is, the theory of financial constraints states that the severity of agency costs should vary with 
the general macroeconomic conditions. It is expected that during recessions a firm’s internal 
finance falls and the demand for external funds rises. Since the cost of external finance 
increases when the firm’s balance sheet deteriorates, investment falls and thus intensifies 
the magnitude of the recession (Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Walsh (1998), 
pp 298–302). Consequently, during recessions, the investment equation may be more 
sensitive to credit than in periods of expansion. This implies a nonlinear relationship between 
investment and credit with changes in output defining the state of the economy. Finally, 
public investment can be the transition variable depending on its impact on the credit market.  
                                                  
21  Weise (1999) shows that in a structural multiple-equation model, a nonlinear equation in at least one of its 
coefficients may lead to a nonlinear representation for all equations in the reduced form of the system. 512  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
We have not found a theoretical explanation for using private investment itself as the 
transition variable. However, we do not rule out this possibility. Provided that the investment 
function is nonlinear, differential impacts of real interest rates and credit availability on 
investment can arise from the dynamic interactions of the other variables included in the 
model. Therefore, all lagged variables explaining investment other than CIV are considered 
potential transition variables. 
5. Estimation 
Teräsvirta (1994) elaborates on the procedure for estimating a smooth transition model in the 
univariate case. Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) discuss this procedure in the multivariate 
context. The technique consists of the following three broad stages. First, specify the linear 
model. Second, apply the test for linearity against STR models following the third order test 
procedure introduced by Luukkonen et al (1988), but using only one transition variable each 
time for all possible values of d. And third, if linearity is rejected, then choose between the 
logistic smooth transition regressive (LSTR) and the exponential smooth transition regressive 
(ESTR) model by testing a sequence of hypotheses. 
5.1  The linear model 
Since no evidence for seasonal unit roots are found in the Venezuelan data, cointegration 
and the number of cointegrating vectors are tested within a linear VEC model from one to 
four lags.
22 Cointegration is tested using the maximum likelihood procedure proposed by 
Johansen (1988, 1991) and well documented in Hamilton (1994). Evidence of cointegration 
is found for one and three lag specifications with LPRIVINV, LPUBINV, and LPRIVGDP as 
endogenous variables. The CIV for one lag is discarded because its coefficients do not look 
reasonable. Therefore, the selected CIV comes from a system specification with three lags 
and it is LPRIVINVt = 0.191 – 0.759 * LPUBINVt + 0.861 * LPRIVGDPt.The trace statistic is 
33.772, significant at 5%.
23 
As a second step, given the existence of one cointegrating vector, the term LPRIVINVt–1 + 
0.759 * LPUBINVt–1 – 0.861 * LPRIVGDPt–1 is used to estimate a linear version of (4.1) where 
dummies for some special events and structural economic reforms are introduced.
24 The 
                                                  
22  In general, it is recommended that the lag length of the VAR in levels should be chosen before testing for 
cointegration (see, for instance, Enders (1995), page 396). However, when using the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) and Schwarz information criterion (SIC) for lag length selection, with the same sample size and 
up to six lags in the VAR, both criteria indicate one lag in the VAR in levels. This implies zero lags in the 
VEC model. Since a longer lag is preferable to one that is too short (Banerjee et al (1993), page 286), an 
alternative procedure is followed to test and estimate the cointegrating vector. That is, using the same 
effective sample size (1984:2–2000:4), cointegration is tested from one up to four lags in the VEC model and 
the cointegrating vector with more reasonable coefficients is selected. 
23   The maximum eigenvalue does not indicate evidence for cointegration. 
24   The dummy variables are DC and DPC, which attempt to control for structural economic reform as specified in 
Section 3. The dummies to control for special events (See Mendoza Lugo (2001), Section 2.3) are introduced 
only after an initial stimation evidences the need to control for some outliers in those periods. These dummies 
are D891 and D942 in the real interest rate equation, D944 and D962 in the credit equation, and D861 in the 
public investment equation. D891 is defined as +1 in 1989:1, –1 in 1989:2 and 0 otherwise. D944 takes the 
value of +1 in 1994:4, –1 in 1995:1 and 0 otherwise. D962 is specified as +1 in 1996:2, –1 in 1996:3 and 0 
otherwise. And finally, D861 is defined as +1 in 1986:1, –1 in 1986:2 and 0 otherwise. D942 is specified as 1 
in 1994:2 and 0 otherwise. After the introduction of these dummies, all equations pass the diagnostic check in 
terms of normality, serial correlation, and heteroskedasticity. The subset VEC model is re-estimated, starting 
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VEC lag length is set arbitrarily equal to 4.
25 Furthermore, insignificant coefficients are 
eliminated using the modified version of the likelihood ratio test suggested by Sims (1980). 
This second step is performed using generalized least squares or seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR). As we can observe, the procedure applied differs from the two-step 
Engle and Granger (1987) method only in the method of estimation applied in each step. The 
resulting estimated subset VEC model is shown in Table 5.1.
26 
5.2 Linearity  test 
A linearity test is performed using its one equation and system version. For the multivariable 
equation setup, we use the augmented first order test proposed by Luukkonen et al (1988), 
which is more suitable for small samples and has more power under the null hypothesis. This 
test can be performed using the following auxiliary regression.  
* 3
2 1 0 t t d t d d t TV TV dv υ + ψ + φ + φ + φ = − − Η Η  (5.1) 
where, 
'
1 - t k - t 1 - t s - t 1 - t r - t 1 - t q - t 1 - t p - t 1 - t ] CIV   , dz , , dz   , dy   ,..., dy , dx , , dx , dw , , dw , dv , , dv [ … … … … = Η
; 
0 φ
 and  d ψ  are scalars and  i φ
 , i = 1,2 are 1 x k* vector of coefficients, k* = p + q + r + s + k. 
The test consists of a hypothesis contrast, using the F statistic, in which the null for linearity 
is set as the coefficients of  2 φ  and  d Ψ  are zero  3 2,λ λ  and  4 λ  are zeros. This test is 
performed for each possible  d - t TV . With this test we cannot perform nested hypothesis tests 
for model selection. However, both models can be estimated and the final model can be 
chosen based on a forecast evaluation. In the particular case of investigating nonlinearities of 
the investment equation on financial factors, the theory suggests the use of a logistic model. 
Therefore, we restrict estimation to this kind of model and without any complication for model 
selection when using the augmented first order linearity test.
27 
                                                                                                                                                       
from a full coefficient or unrestricted VEC model accounting for those especial events that the new dummies 
attempt to control for. 
25   One problem encountered when specifying an unrestricted VEC model using the Venezuelan data is related to 
the lag length selection. Both SIC and AIC suggest a VAR in levels with one lag or its corresponding VEC with 
no lags. However, it is observed that when estimating the unrestricted VEC with a higher number of lags that 
significant coefficients are not uniform with respect to the lag length for the lagged values of each variable in 
each regression in the VEC model. The main problem in continuing with an unrestricted VEC with lag length 
selected arbitrarily, say four lags, is the presence of too many insignificant coefficients. The price of too many 
insignificant coefficients is higher variance and consequently imprecise impulse response functions. But 
proceeding with too short a lag specification may lead us to conclude that a variable, or variables, does not 
affect the others because of a misspecification in the lag order for such a variable. Thus, it may be preferable 
to choose the lag length arbitrarily, which we set equal to 4, and estimate with a restricted-in-coefficients 
version or subset VEC model. An early proponent of subset VAR is Hsiao (1981), who proposes a procedure 
for choosing, different number of lags for each variable in the VAR based on the final prediction error (FPE) 
criterion. McMillin (1985) applies a subset VAR to investment in the United States. Lütkepohl (1993, Chapter 5), 
discusses specification procedures, advantages, and disadvantages for restricted VAR, which are also 
applicable to a VEC. 
26  E-views is used for all computational procedures but the impulse response functions. In this case, we use 
GAUSS. 
27  In general, third order linearity test proposed by Luukkonen et al (1988), which is based on the following 
multivariate auxiliary regression. However, in a multivariate context the auxiliary regression contains 1 + 4k* 





Venezuela: estimated subset VEC model  
for private investment and its determinants 
Period 1984:3–2000:4 
  DLPRIVINVt DDLCREDITt DRIQt DLPRIVGDPt DLPUBINVt 
  Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.
C  –0.273 –6.844 –0.004 –0.601 0.008 1.308 –0.115 –8.181 –0.563 –9.858
DS2  0.575    5.722 – – – –   0.175 7.013  0.866  8.197
DS3  –  – 0.028 1.969 0.020 1.750 0.142 8.218 0.804  10.613
DS4  0.422  6.231 – – –0.043 –3.720 0.191 8.745 0.737 8.533
D861        0.359  5.705
D891      –0.211 –12.417   
D942          –0.098 –4.124   
D944     –0.246 –7.220    
D962     –0.230 –6.853    
DPC  – – – – – – – – – –
DLPRIVINVt–1  –0.321  –3.669 – – – – 0.043 2.211 – –
DLPRIVINVt–2  –0.190  –2.157 – – – – – – – –
DLPRIVINVt–3  – – – – – – 0.079 4.528  0.182  2.634
DLPRIVINVt–4  –0.304  –3.591 – – – – – –  0.157  2.090
DDLCREDITt–1  0.520  2.881 –0.201 –2.776 –0.103 –2.682 – – –0.270 –1.730
DDLCREDITt–2 – – – – –0.117 –3.041 – – – –
DDLCREDITt–3  –  – –0.158 –2.230 –0.087 –2.266 – –  –  –
DDLCREDITt–4 – – – – –0.069 –1.849 – – – –
DRIQt–1  –  – 0.294 2.436 – – – – 0.873 3.475
DRIQt–2  – – – – – – – –  1.184  4.613
DRIQt–3  –0.783  –2.581 – – –0.184 –2.901 – –  –0.542  –1.926
DRIQt–4  – – – – – – –0.151 –2.331  –0.661  –2.524
DLPRIVGDPt–1  1.876  3.800 – – – – –0.206 –2.141  1.992  5.105
DLPRIVGDPt–2  1.115  2.764 – – 0.231 2.629 – –  1.702  4.806
DLPRIVGDPt–3  2.420  5.521 –0.397 –3.377 –0.228 –2.537 – –  –  –
DLPRIVGDPt–4 – – – – – – –0.189 –1.928  –1.509  –3.999
DLPUBINVt–1  0.172  1.787 – – 0.045 4.276 0.082 4.098 –0.350 –4.388
DLPUBINVt–2  –0.279  –4.566 – – – – 0.064 3.554  –0.136  –1.917
DLPUBINVt–3  – – – – – – 0.085 4.826  –0.178  –2.669
DLPUBINVt–4  – – – – – –   – – – –
CIV –  –    –0.036 –2.841  –0.174  –3.493BIS Papers No 35  515
 
 
Table 5.1 (cont) 
Venezuela: estimated subset VEC model  
for private investment and its determinants 
Period 1984:3–2000:4 
  DLPRIVINVt DDLCREDITt DRIQt DLPRIVGDPt DLPUBINVt 
  Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.
R
2adj.   0.482  0.647 0.738 0.763  0.917
Q(1)   0.121  0.474 1.547 1.020  0.346
Q(4)   1.064  2.422 5.489 3.158  3.835
Qsr(1)   1.678  0.416 0.169 0.867  1.517
Qsr(4)   4.032  1.371 0.405 4.866  2.515
Hausman     –0.196   0.756
JB   2.076  2.645 1.652 2.278  0.092
Notes: The restricted VEC model is estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). R
2 adj. is the 
adjusted R
2. Q(i) (Qsr(i)) is the Ljung-Box Q-statistic for the ith lag of the residuals (squared of residuals). 
JB accounts for the Jarque-Bera statistic for normality. JB is distributed as a χ
2 with two degrees of freedom. 
The Q-statistics are distributed as χ
2 with i degrees of freedom. The critical values for χ
2
I,0.05 (χ
2 i,0.1), for i = 1 and 
4 are 3.84 and 9.49 (2.71 and 7.78) respectively. CIV denotes the cointegrating vector. Hausman corresponds to 
the t-statistics for the Hausman test. The Hausman test is performed for the credit and public investment 
equations. Due to the way interest rates are calculated in this research (see Mendoza Lugo (2001, Appendix A) 
RIQt–1 contains information for one month of quarter t, then there exists the possibility that DRIQt–1, which enters 
in the credit and public investment equations, is an endogenous variable. For the Hausman test: (i) DRIQt–1 is 
regressed on the right hand side variables of each of the above-mentioned equations plus the variables on the 
right hand side of the interest rate equation (all of them lagged one period); contemporaneous variables to 
DRIQt–1 are omitted from the regression; (ii) the residuals from the estimated interest rate equation are retrieved; 
and (iii) the credit or public investment equation augmented for the residuals from the previous step is estimated. 
The Hausman statistic is the t-statistic on the estimated coefficient for the residuals obtained from the interest 
rate equation. If the estimated coefficient is not statistically different from zero, we must conclude that DRIQt–1 is 
not an endogenous variable. The test statistics do not indicate evidence for endogeneity in DRIQt–1. 
 
Weise (1999) introduces a linearity test for a multiple-equation framework. This is a likelihood 
ratio test. Instead of a first order test extended to a multiple-equation framework proposed by 
Weise, we use a multi-equation version of the augmented first order test and correct for small 
sample bias.
28 
Table 5.2 reports the results of the linearity tests for each equation, the F test, and for the 
whole system, the LR test. The first 10 columns show the linearity test statistics and their 
respective P-values for each dependent variable described at the top of the table. The last 
two columns contain information about the LR statistics for each transition variable and their 
                                                  
28   Due to the cumbersome joint tests for no cointegration and linearity against cointegration and nonlinear 
(threshold) specification, where not only nostationarity and nuisance parameters are present under the null but 
there is also a large class of nonlinear (threshold) specifications, Balke and Fomby (1997) suggest breaking 
up this analysis into two parts. These are: (i) a test for cointegration; and (ii) a test for nonlinear behavior. An 
important argument in favor of this separation is that standard time series analysis for linear cointegration is 
asymptotically valid for the threshold cointegration because the order of integration is not affected by a 
threshold specification. From a Monte Carlo experiment, they find that no serious problems arise when testing 
for cointegration using a linear misspecified model. Van Dijk and Franses (1995) use the same procedure to 
estimate a smooth transition vector error correction model. For other references on threshold and smooth 
transition EC models, see Franses and van Dijk (2000), page 133. 516  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
respective P-values. The LR test suggests the use of DLCREDIT as the transition variable. It 
reports low P-values for delays of 1, 2, and 4 being the lowest one for DLCREDITt–1. The LR 
test also reports P-values lower than 5% when DRIQ and DLPRIVGDP are the transition 
variables with delays of 4 and 1 respectively. On the other hand, the F test does not always 
suggest using as the transition variable the same variable indicated by the LR test. For 
instance, the LR test indicates DLCREDITt–2 as a good choice when searching for a common 
transition variable and delay parameter. However, the F test in the equation for DLPRIVGDP 
reports a P-value of 0.941, which suggests that the use of DLCREDITt–2 as transition variable 
may not be a good choice to explain the potential nonlinearity in the output equation, even 
though this equation is estimated in a multi-equation context.  
The F test reports evidence against linearity in all five equations. In the private investment 
equation, linearity is rejected at the 5% significance level when DLCREDITt–1 and RIQt–4 are 
the transition variables. For the remaining four equations, only in the output equation does 
the test fail to reject linearity when financial variables are used as transition variables. 
However, the test rejects linearity in the output equation when DLPUBINVt–4 is the transition 
variable. In addition, the linearity test for each single equation does not report evidence for 
the use of a unique transition variable and delay parameter in all equations. 
Teräsvirta (1994), following Tsay (1989), recommends choosing the delay parameter, d, in 
the univariate model as the value with the minimum P-value. Generalizing this decision rule 
to a multivariate context, it should be to choose the transition variable, TV, and the delay 
parameter d; that is, TVt–d, as the dth order lagged variable with the minimum P-value. We 
could also select, among the potential TVs with tests reporting P-values lower than 5%, each 
variable with the lowest P-value for each potential TV and proceed to estimate the model for 
each of these candidates and then make the final selection based on specification tests. We 
explore this possibility by attempting to estimate the nonlinear model equation by equation 
using as TVs all possible candidates with F tests reporting a P-value lower or equal than 5%. 
We also attempt to estimate the nonlinear model, within a system procedure, using the same 
transition variable for all equations as suggested by Weise (1999) according to the LR test. 





Venezuela: linearity test using the  
estimated subset VEC model as benchmark 
DLPRIVINVt DDLCREDITt DRIQt DLPRIVGDPt DLPUBINVt  SYSTEM 
Transition 
variable  F-
stat.  P-val.  F-
stat.  P-val. F-
stat. P-val. F-
stat. P-val. F-
stat.  P-val.  LR-
stat. P-val.
DLPRIVINVt–1 1.277 0.276  0.551  0.737 0.360 0.947 1.326 0.252 1.546 0.157  57.452 0.219
DLPRIVINVt–2 0.735 0.699  0.613  0.691 0.759 0.654 0.996 0.464 1.015 0.470  41.227 0.807
DLPRIVINVt–3 1.650 0.125  1.233  0.308 0.695 0.709 1.947 0.068 0.231 0.998  58.078 0.202
DLPRIVINVt–4 1.164 0.344  1.306  0.277 0.611 0.780 1.996 0.062 0.720 0.745  59.976 0.158
DDLCREDITt–1 0.908 0.542  0.609  0.693 1.690 0.124 0.692 0.726 0.920 0.554  43.933 0.714
DDLCREDITt–2 0.651 0.773  1.076  0.385 1.452 0.200 0.476 0.895 1.665 0.121  50.648 0.448
DDLCREDITt–3 0.782 0.656  0.673  0.646 1.024 0.438 0.740 0.682 0.674 0.786  42.725 0.758
DDLCREDITt–4 1.311 0.257  1.257  0.298 0.451 0.898 0.912 0.532 0.549 0.888  45.014 0.673
DRIQt–1 0.694 0.735  0.176  0.970 1.044 0.424 0.802 0.628 0.853 0.617  43.830 0.718
DRIQt–2 1.493 0.176  1.253  0.299 1.198 0.324 1.903 0.075 2.153  0.040  66.501 0.059
DRIQt–3 1.174 0.338  1.062  0.393 3.942 0.001 0.933 0.514 1.046 0.444  64.561 0.081
DRIQt–4 1.535 0.160  2.127  0.078 1.527 0.173 0.990 0.469 0.729 0.736  68.767 0.040
DLPRIVGDPt–1 1.314 0.255 1.221 0.313 4.340 0.001 1.342 0.244 0.761 0.705  68.972 0.039
DLPRIVGDPt–21.288 0.270 1.132 0.356 2.460 0.025 0.660 0.753 1.060 0.432  57.201 0.225
DLPRIVGDPt–30.334 0.972 1.043 0.403 1.121 0.371 0.417 0.930 1.325 0.254  53.271 0.350
DLPRIVGDPt–40.981 0.481 0.249 0.939 1.622 0.143 1.092 0.393 1.087 0.411  56.573 0.243
DLPUBINVt–1 1.750 0.100  1.020  0.416 4.180 0.001 0.745 0.678 0.914 0.559  56.082 0.257
DLPUBINVt–2 1.016 0.452  0.938  0.465 0.810 0.610 1.204 0.320 0.814 0.655  46.310 0.622
DLPUBINVt–3 0.735 0.698  0.357  0.875 0.721 0.687 1.905 0.075 2.322  0.027  61.843 0.122
DLPUBINVt–4 1.031 0.440  0.112  0.989 4.164 0.001 2.227 0.037 0.492 0.924  64.271 0.084
DLCREDITt–1 2.088 0.047  3.919  0.005 1.901 0.081 1.116 0.376 1.372 0.230  87.865 0.001
DLCREDITt–2 1.118 0.375  3.169  0.015 3.763 0.002 0.395 0.941 2.146  0.041  76.466 0.009
DLCREDITt–3 1.227 0.304  3.438  0.010 2.210 0.042 0.491 0.885 0.458 0.942  61.725 0.124
DLCREDITt–4 2.013 0.055  2.777  0.028 1.008 0.451 1.206 0.318 1.031 0.457  75.493 0.011
RIQt–1 1.836 0.083  1.282  0.287 0.989 0.465 0.926 0.521 0.559 0.880  45.504 0.654
RIQt–2 0.719 0.713  2.725  0.030 1.187 0.330 1.176 0.336 0.700 0.763  47.885 0.559
RIQt–3 0.869 0.577  0.859  0.516 2.055 0.059 0.765 0.660 1.528 0.164  65.158 0.073
RIQt–4 2.532 0.017  1.378 0.249 2.187 0.044 0.949 0.501 0.705 0.758  67.361 0.051
Notes: P-values lower than 5% are reported in dark numbers. 
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5.3  Estimation procedure for the logistic STVEC model 
Due to the lack of evidence for estimating the logistic STVEC (LSTVEC) model for a single 
TVt–d, the nonlinear system is estimated equation by equation and then the five equations are 
put together and the logistic STVEC (LSTVEC) model is re-estimated using SUR. We start 
the estimation procedure by performing a two-dimensional grid search for the transition 
parameter, c, and the smooth parameter, γ , using as TVt–d all possibilities in Table 4.3 that 
are associated with linearity tests having P-values lower than 5%. Previously, the argument 
of the transition function, F(TVt–d), is rescaled downward by dividing by the standard 
deviation of TVt–d as recommended by the estimation of the logistic model when the smooth 
parameter is large. This rescaling helps the computing process in the model estimation. See 
for instance, Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), page 123.
29 
We arrange the values of TVt–d in ascending order and divide the range of values taken by 
that variable into 10 intervals, which gives 11 grid values. We assure all intervals contain 
information by discarding atypical observations from the range of values for TVt–d. The 
search for the transition parameter, c, is performed for the nine grids located between both 
extremes. The search for the smooth parameter, γ , consists of 25 values from 1 to 49 
augmenting two by two. For those cases where γ  is located in the upper extreme, a new 
search is made for higher values of γ . Thus, there are at least 225 combinations for c and γ  
in each two-dimensional grid search. We select that combination of c and γ  reporting the 
maximum log-likelihood.
30 
Those cases where the log-likelihood takes the maximum value for c located in any of the 
extremes of the range of values for the transition variable are ruled out.
31 We proceed using 
only those cases where the value of c maximizing the log-likelihood is located between the 
third and eighth grid values. The best value of c should be a value of TVt–d located in some 
part within the middle of its observed range of values such that it guarantees both regimes 
contain enough observations for reliable estimates of the coefficients. 
With starting values from the two-dimensional grid search, the parameter γ  is allowed to vary 
while c is fixed to the value obtained in the previous step. Once γ  is estimated, a new grid 
search is performed; this time only for the parameter c. Next, with starting values from the 
previous step, γ  is allowed to vary again. Finally, we allow all parameters to vary setting 
initial values from the previous step. In each step involving the estimation of γ  or the joint 
                                                  
29  In previous work, we tried to estimate the nonlinear model by performing a grid search for the transition 
parameter, c, and fixing the standardized smooth parameter, γ  , equal to the standard deviation of TVt–d. 
However, in most of the cases the value of c maximizing the log-likelihood was located at the extremes of the 
range of values taken by the transition variable. Such a result suggests that the equation is linear or the value 
given to γ  is not the most adequate. 
30   Other alternative measures of fit are AIC, SIC, and R
2, obtaining similar results. 
31   Within a two-dimensional grid search, a transition parameter taking values in any of the extremes of the range 
of values of the transition variable is probably a consequence of the presence of outliers. A problem facing the 
linearity tests for smooth transition models is that they may be biased toward rejecting the null hypothesis due 
to the presence of outliers. See for instance, Franses and van Dijk (2000), page 105. In the present study, 
some alternatives for TVt–d are discarded when the transition parameter is found in the extreme values of the 
range of TVt–d when performing the two-dimensional grid search. The discarded choices for TVt–d, in the credit 
equation, are all lagged DLCREDIT, but DLCREDITt–3. In addition, RIQt–4, DRIQt–2, and DLPUBINVt–4 are 
rejected as TVt–d in the equations for DRIQ, DLPUBINV, and DLPRIVGDP. Since the linearity test does not 
indicate other possible TV for the output growth equation, then this equation is treated as linear. Moreover, 
information for the estimated equation for DDLCREDIT under the assumption that RIQt–2 is TVt–d is not 
reported in Table 4.3 since a unique solution for this alternative was not found. BIS Papers No 35  519
 
 
estimation of γ  and c, each equation is estimated using nonlinear least squares (NLS). The 
estimated coefficients γˆ and c ˆ for each equation are reported in Table 5.3.
32 
Fixing the parameters c and γ  to those values obtained from the single equation procedure, 
the LSTVEC model is estimated, using SUR. To alleviate computing problems, insignificant 
coefficients on lagged variables are eliminated. As a second step, in theory, all coefficients 
are allowed to vary using the estimated coefficients from the previous step as initial values. 
However, some computing problems, which may be associated with the estimation of logistic 
models in small samples and large adjustment parameters, as is the case in general for the 
logistic smooth transition (LSTR) models, leads us to seek the maximum number of smooth 
and transition parameters that can be jointly estimated while fixing the remaining ones to 
those values obtained from the estimation for each single nonlinear equation.  
We evaluate three combinations of transition variables and delay parameters in order to 
proceed to the estimation of the LSTVEC model. These three options are illustrated in Table 
5.4. In Option 1 we allow for the same transition variable. In this case it is DLCREDIT but 
allowing for different delay parameters. Option 2 is selected according to the TVt–d associated 
with the higher log-likelihood value for each nonlinear equation. Finally, Option 3 differs from 
Option 2 only in the TVt–d chosen for the private investment equation. In this case, RIQt–4 is 
used as TVt–d. This option is taken into account because the log-likelihood values are only 
slightly different from the case when DLCREDITt–1 is TVt–d (see Table 5.3). The final 
specification(s) for the LSTVEC model will be chosen based on diagnostic tests on the 
residuals and long-run dynamic evaluation. 
                                                  
32   Teräsvirta (1998), page 527, recommends the use of a two-dimensional grid search to get reasonable starting 





Venezuela: summary of the estimation of each  
single nonlinear equation for each potential TV 





2 = θ ) 
Loglk 
TV for DLPRIVINV Equation             
DLCREDITt–1  37.543 0.560 0.006 1.228 0.094  66.056 
RIQt–4  44.156 1.122 0.034  19.040 0.400  65.956 
TV for DDLCREDIT Equation             
DLCREDITt–3  65.438 0.236 0.036 5.374 0.000  120.467 
TV for DRIQ Equation             
DRIQt–3  33.127 0.679 0.036 5.141 0.036  173.960 
DLPRIVGDPt–1  33.102 0.955 0.014 2.313 0.004  175.100 
DLPRIVGDPt–2  –3.046  –0.944 0.021 0.897 0.937  167.577 
DLPUBINVt–1  6.963  0.530 –0.076 –0.563  0.045  172.317 
DLPUBINVt–4  92.768 0.188 0.132  12.437 0.001  178.846 
DLCREDITt–2  60.176  0.467 –0.013 –4.341  0.438  162.068 
DLCREDITt–3  84.711  0.308 –0.049 –1.911  0.074  167.728 
TV for DLPUBINV Equation             
DLPUBINVt–3  10.672  0.944 –0.046 –0.978  0.020  97.364 
DLCREDITt–2  3.221  1.992 –0.053 –2.068  0.368  92.275 
Notes: Loglk denotes log-likelihood. F-test ( 0
'
2 = θ ) is the test of whether the estimated coefficients 
accompanying the transition function in each single equation are jointly equal to zero. It tests for the specification 
of the LSTR models against a linear specification. However, when the equations are estimated in a system, in 
particular for DLPRIVINV and DLPUBINV equations with RIQt–4 and DLCREDITt–2 as TVt–d, and insignificant 
coefficients are dropped from the system applying a LR test, there is no evidence that all those coefficients are 
equal to zero. Even though the t-statistics for the estimated coefficients c and γ are reported in this table, the 
lowest t-statistics cannot be interpreted as evidence for linearity. A precise estimation of γ  needs many 
observations around c and becomes more difficult when this parameter is large. See for instance, Franses and 
van Dijk (2000), page 91 and Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), page 123. Another element we should consider is 
that these parameters are not identified under the null hypothesis of linearity (Davies problem), so they do not 
follow the standard distribution. 





Venezuela: estimation options for the nonlinear system  
according to the selection of transition variables 
 Transition  variables 
Equation for:  Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
DLPRIVINVt DLCREDITt–1 DLCREDITt–1 RIQt–4 
DDLCREDITt DLCREDITt–3 DLCREDITt–3 DLCREDITt–3 
DRIQt DLCREDITt–3 DLPUBINVt–4 DLPUBINVt–4 
DLPUBINVt DLCREDITt–2 DLPUBINVt–3 DLPUBINVt–3 
 
After estimation, we evaluate each of the three specifications. For such purposes, we use 
diagnostic tests on the residuals and evaluate the long-run properties while computing 
impulse response functions.
33 Only in Option 1 is convergence achieved. Options 2 and 3 are 
discarded because they are globally unstable. How the impulse response functions are 
computed is the subject of the next section. A diagnostic test is performed on the residuals of 
Option 1. We apply the F test version of the LM serial correlation test proposed by Eitrheim 
and Teräsvirta (1996) in the four nonlinear equations. This test can be seen as a 
generalization of the Breusch and Pagan LM test for autocorrelation for linear specifications 
(Franses and van Dijk (2000), page 110). In addition, the Jarque-Bera normality test and the 
Engle’s ARCH-LM test are applied to all five equations.
34 All equations passed diagnostic 
tests except the credit equation, which presented serial correlation. Adding own lag values 
omitted in the linear specification, DDLCREDITt–2 and DDLCREDITt–4, solves serial 
correlation, in the credit equation. The residuals of this equation also present an important 
outlier in 1989:1, the period of implementation of the structural reform program. Thus, D891 
was included to control for this effect. Under the new specification all equations pass the 
diagnostic test. The statistics for these tests are reported in the bottom of Table 5.5. 
                                                  
33   The evaluation of the long-run dynamic of smooth transition models cannot be done analytically. A numerical 
solution is instead recommended. See Teräsvirta et al (1994), page 2945 and Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), 
page 128. Also, we can evaluate the dynamic properties of the model when computing the impulse responses. 
That is, if the effects of a shock die out, this implies the model is stationary. 
34   Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996) do not recommend using the Ljung-Box Q-statistic to analyze the residuals of 
smooth transition models because its distribution is unknown under the null. Eitrheim and Teräsvirta also 
propose a test for remaining nonlinearity and parameter constancy for smooth transition models. However, 
because of data limitations and the large number of additional parameters to be estimated in this research, 





Venezuela: estimated logistic smooth transition  
subset vector error correction (LSTVEC) model  
for private investment and its determinants  
with lagged rate of growth of real stock  
of credit used as transition variable (Option 1) 
Period 1984:3–2000:4 
  DLPRIVINVt DDLCREDITt DRIQt DLPRIVGDPt DLPUBINVt 
  Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.
C1  –0.300 –8.719 –0.002 –0.385 0.013 2.281 –0.112 –7.798 –0.515  –14.110
DS2 0.582  6.843  –    – – – 0.171 6.755  0.897  13.401
DS3 –  –  0.026  2.347 0.041 3.495 0.141 8.001 0.917  14.237
DS4 0.481  8.110  –  – –0.036 –3.078 0.185 8.277 0.666  13.768
D861  – – – – – – – –  0.346  7.159
D891 –  –  –0.089  –3.635 –0.220 –13.853 – – – –
D942  – – – – –0.077 –3.388 – – – –
D944 –  –  –0.237  –9.846 – – – –  –  –
D962 –  –  –0.296  –10.003 – – – – – –
DLPRIVINVt–1 –0.500  –4.644  –  – – – 0.043 2.190  –  –
DLPRIVINVt–2  – – – – – – – – – –
DLPRIVINVt–3  – – – – – – 0.080 4.446  0.832  4.853
DLPRIVINVt–4 –0.194  –2.253  –  – – – – –  0.170  3.167
DDLCREDITt–1 0.523 3.213  –0.147  –2.362 – – – –  –  –
DDLCREDITt–2 – –  –0.088  –1.547 –0.085 –2.081 – – –  –
DDLCREDITt–3 – –  –0.240  –3.597 – – – – –  –
DDLCREDITt–4 – –  –0.074  –1.007 0.203 2.360 – – –  –
DRIQt–1 –  –  0.367  4.046 – – – –  2.251  5.926
DRIQt–2  – – – – – – – –  2.839  9.431
DRIQt–3 –0.706  –2.770  –  – –0.150 –2.403 – –  –  –
DRIQt–4  – – – – – – –0.149 –2.242    2.099  3.667
DLPRIVGDPt–1 1.680 3.878  –  – – – –0.220 –2.258  –  –
DLPRIVGDPt–2 1.331 3.270  –  – 0.292 2.480 – –  –  –
DLPRIVGDPt–3 2.321 5.183  –0.201  –2.265 –0.153 –1.712 – –  –  –
DLPRIVGDPt–4 – – – – – – –0.167 –1.666 – –
DLPUBINVt–1 0.182  2.262  –  – 0.097 5.458 0.080 3.925  –  –
DLPUBINVt–2 –0.389  –6.672  –  – – – 0.062 3.397 0.781 5.689
DLPUBINVt–3  – – – – – – 0.079 4.394 – –
DLPUBINVt–4  – – – – – – – – – –
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Table 5.5 (cont) 
Venezuela: estimated logistic smooth transition  
subset vector error correction (LSTVEC) model  
for private investment and its determinants  
with lagged rate of growth of real stock  
of credit used as transition variable (Option 1) 
Period 1984:3–2000:4 
  DLPRIVINVt DDLCREDITt DRIQt DLPRIVGDPt DLPUBINVt 
  Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.
CIV –  –  – – – – –0.038 –2.924  –0.452 –4.790
C2  F(.)  –  – –0.055 –2.936 –0.021 –2.687 – – –0.074 –1.741
DLPRIVINVt–1 
F(.)  0.471  2.940 – – – – – – – –
DLPRIVINVt–2 
F(.)  – – – – – – – – – –
DLPRIVINVt–3 
F(.)  – – – – – – – –  –0.770 –3.823
DLPRIVINVt–4 
F(.)  –0.565  –2.973 – – – – – – – –
DDLCREDITt–1 
F(.) –  –  –0.653 –3.252 –0.165 –2.708 – –  – –
DDLCREDITt–2 
F(.)  – –  –0.468 –2.145 –0.184 –2.168 – – – –
DDLCREDITt–3 
F(.) –  –  0.341 2.436 – –  – –
DDLCREDITt–4 
F(.) –  –  0.080 0.638 –0.243 –2.570 – –  – –
DRIQt–1  F(.)  –  – –3.674 –5.136 – – – – –3.662 –4.672
DRIQt–2 F(.)  –  –  – – – – – –  –2.437 –4.069
DRIQt–3  F(.)  – – – – –0.251 –1.997 – – – –
DRIQt–4 F(.)  –  –  – – – – – –  –4.586 –4.456
DLPRIVGDPt–1 
F(.) –  –  – – – – – –  2.065 5.418
DLPRIVGDPt–2 
F(.) –1.569  –2.187  – – 0.196 1.752 – –  2.172 5.234
DLPRIVGDPt–3 
F(.)  1.387  2.624 – – – – – – – –
DLPRIVGDPt–4 
F(.) –  –  – – – – – –  –2.004 –5.123
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Table 5.5 (cont) 
Venezuela: estimated logistic smooth transition  
subset vector error correction (LSTVEC) model  
for private investment and its determinants  
with lagged rate of growth of real stock  
of credit used as transition variable (Option 1) 
Period 1984:3–2000:4 
  DLPRIVINVt DDLCREDITt DRIQt DLPRIVGDPt DLPUBINVt 
  Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.
DLPUBINVt–1 
F(.)  –  – –  – –0.075 –3.480 – –  –0.377  –4.749
DLPUBINVt–2 
F(.)  0.312  2.492 –  – – – – –  –0.997  –5.957
DLPUBINVt–3 
F(.)  –  – –  – – – – –  –0.346  –4.520
DLPUBINVt–4 
F(.)  –  – –  – – – – –  –  –
CIV  F(.)  –  – –  – – – – –  0.392  2.835
γ ˆ   33.295 0.819 65.438 (fixed) 87.711 (fixed) – –  3.110  3.792
c ˆ   0.008 2.223  0.035  22.195 –0.049 (fixed) – –  –0.047  –5.366
R
2adj 0.600    0.789    0.788 0.767    0.949 
JB 1.067    4.009  0.404 1.982    1.484 
FAR(1) 0.001    2.449  0.541 1.298    0.064 
FAR(4) 0.325    1.048  0.541 0.722    0.117 
FARCH(1) 0.002    0.015 1.132 0.611    0.510 
FARCH(4) 0.369    0.753 0.466 0.851    1.159 
Notes: To calculate FAR(i), i = 1,4, missing observations at the beginning of the series of lagged residuals are 
replaced by zeros as recommended by Teräsvirta (1998), page 520. C1 and C2 denote the constant term in the 
linear and augmented part of each equation, respectively. R2 adj. is the adjusted R2. F(.) denotes the logistic 
smooth transition function. JB accounts for the Jarque-Bera statistic to test for normality. It is distributed as a  2
2 χ . 
CIV denotes the cointegrating vector. 
 
The estimated transition functions 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 depict the four estimated transition functions for Option 1. Transition is 
very fast from one regime to the other in all equations but public investment. In the credit and 
interest rate equations, with too few observations around the estimated transition parameters 
and a high speed of adjustment given by the estimated smooth parameters, the transition 
function takes mainly values of zero and one, indicating threshold specifications. The 
transition function for the private investment equation depicts a fast transition from the low to 
the high regime. 
In the private investment equation, the estimated value of c = 0.008 – which is close to zero – 
allows the association of these two regimes to credit contraction (F(.) = 0) and credit BIS Papers No 35  525
 
 
expansion (F(.) = 1). However, this cannot be generalized to other equations in the system 
because estimated transition parameters close to zero are not observed in those equations. 
For instance, the estimated value of c has similar negative values, –0.047 and –0.049, in the 
public investment and interest rate equations respectively while it is positive and equal to 
0.035 in the credit equation. 
Figure 5.1 
Private investment and credit equations: 














































































Real interest rate and public investment equations:  










































































(d) Transition function for DLPUBINV equation  
6.  Testing for differential effects of real interest rates and credit 
availability on private investment 
To investigate the differential effects of interest rates and credit availability on private 
investment, we compute generalized impulse response functions
35 using the Monte Carlo 
                                                  
35  Generalized impulse response functions can be used for linear and nonlinear models. However, they are 
particularly recommended for computing the effect of shocks in one variable on the forecast of another 
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technique described in Koop et al (1996) and applied by Weise (1999) to study the 
asymmetric effects of monetary policy using data for the US. We explore how private 
investment responds to shocks of different sizes and signs and how different this response is 
when there is a credit contraction or expansion. In addition to shocks to financial variables, 
we also investigate how the growth rate of private investment responds to shocks to the 
growth rate of public investment, private GDP, and to its own growth rate.
36 
This section presents the impulse response functions for one-standard-error positive, 
negative, and average shocks.
37 Negative shocks are multiplied by minus one to make them 
comparable to the responses to one-standard-error shocks. We also compute impulse 
response functions to two-standard-error shocks and normalize them by dividing by two to 
make them comparable to the responses to one-standard-error shocks.  
However, these results are not shown because, in general, we found similar impulse 
response functions to one-standard-error shocks. 
6.1  Response of DLPRIVINV to shocks of different sign to DRIQ 
Shocks to DRIQ have the opposite sign on DLPRIVINV. Figure 6.1 reports the effect of 
shocks of different signs to DRIQ on DLPRIVINV. This figure shows that DLPRIVINV is more 
responsive to negative shocks than to positive shocks to DRIQ, and this effect is stronger for 
both positive and negative shocks when the shock is caused in the low credit regime. At 
longer periods, a negative shock has a cumulative positive effect on DLPRIVINV, and this 
effect seems to be stronger when the shock occurs in the low credit regime. Positive shocks 
are also found to be stronger in the lower credit regime, but this effect, in absolute terms, is 
smaller than the effect of negative shocks to DRIQ. 
6.2  Response of DLPRIVINV to shocks of different signs to DDLCREDIT 
Figure 6.2 reports that positive shocks to DDLCREDIT have positive impacts on DLPRIVINV 
and that these impacts are stronger and less volatile when the economy is initially in the high 
credit regime. While negative shocks cause a contraction in DLPRIVINV in earlier periods, 
the cumulative response of DLPRIVINV to DDLCREDIT oscillates between positive and 
negative values in later periods. We interpret this last result as having no effect on the rate of 
growth of private investment. 
When the economy is initially facing a credit contraction, in earlier periods, a negative shock 
to DDLCREDIT has a stronger effect on DLPRIVINV than a positive shock (see Figure 6.2.c). 
This result is mild evidence for a more responsive private investment to credit when credit 
restrictions are more severe, as the theory of financial liberalization predicts. 
                                                                                                                                                       
variable when using a nonlinear model. Generalized impulse response functions take into account that in a 
nonlinear model impulse response functions depend on the initial conditions and on the sign and magnitude of 
the shocks. 
36   Structural shocks are identified using a Choleski decomposition following the order DLPUBINV, DLPRIVGDP, 
DLPRIVINV, DRIQ, DDLCREDIT. With this ordering, it is assumed that the government takes investment 
decisions based on the past information of private sector variables. Also, it is probable that DLPRIVGDP 
affects DLPRIVINV rather than the other way around in the short run. Since the correlation between 
DLPRIVINV and DRIQ is contemporaneously positive, then DLPRIVINV should affect DRIQ. The converse 
does not make theoretical sense even though we investigate whether the effects of the real interest rate on 
private investment can be positive given some economic conditions. A similar ordering is used for the ordering 
of DRIQ and DDLCREDIT. For more specific details on how the generalized impulse response functions are 
constructed in this study, see Mendoza Lugo (2001), Chapter IV. 
37  One-standard-error shock to these five variables, in the same order as is listed, are of the following size: 
1.044, 1.074, 0.996, 1.178, and 1.018. 528  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
6.3  Response of DLPRIVINV to shocks of different signs to DLPUBINV 
Shocks to DLPUBINV have opposite effects on DLPRIVINV. A negative shock to DLPUBINV 
has an important cumulative positive effect on DLPRIVINV up to period 12. Some 
asymmetries are observed after the third period between positive and negative shocks. That 
is, DLPRIVINV is more volatile with positive shocks and more responsive to negative shocks 
to DLPUBINV (Figure 6.3). 
Figure 6.1 
Venezuela: effects of one-standard-error  
positive and negative shocks to DRIQ on DLPRIVINV 
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(c) Cumulative response of DLPRIVINV to DRIQ: Low credit regime




Venezuela: effects of one-standard-error  
negative and positive shocks to DDLCREDIT on DLPRIVINV 
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(c) Cumulative response of DLPRIVINV to DDLCREDIT: Low credit regime
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Venezuela: effects of one-standard-error  
positive and negative shocks to DLPUBINV on DLPRIVINV 
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6.4  Responses of DLPRIVINV to shocks to DLPRIVGDP and DLPRIVINV 
Even when private investment causes private GDP in the long run without causality observed 
in the opposite direction, impulse response functions of DLPRIVINV to shocks to 
DLPRIVGDP reveal this variable to be the most important determinant of private investment 
in the short run. A standard error shock to DLPRIVGDP causes a cumulative response in 
DLPRIVINV of 16% by the third period. After that period, this effect starts to decrease, 
achieving values near zero by the 12th period (Figure 6.4). Furthermore, DLPRIVINV has an 
important immediate response of the same sign to its own shocks. This, however, vanishes 
as time passes and reaches near zero by the 12th period (Figure 6.5). In both cases, 
responses are symmetric and independent of the initial state of the economy. 
Figure 6.4 
Venezuela: effects of one-standard-error  
positive and negative shocks to DLPRIVGDP on DLPRIVINV 







0 2 4 6 8 10 12
1 s.e. neg. shock (times -1)



















0 2 4 6 8 10 12
1 s.e. neg. shock (times -1)



















0 2 4 6 8 10 12
1 s.e. neg. shock (times -1)












(c) Cumulative response of DLPRIVINV to DLPRIVGDP: Low credit




Venezuela: effects of one-standard-error  
positive and negative shocks to DLPRIVINV on DLPRIVINV 
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(c) Cumulative response of DLPRIVINV to DLPRIVINV: Low credit regime




Venezuela is a developing country that had very low average real interest rates in the past. 
Part of the period of study, 1983:1–1988:4, was characterized by administrative controls on 
nominal interest rates. Since 1989, more flexible interest rate policies have been adopted. 
According to the financial liberalization theory, we should expect that in those economies 
with very low or negative real interest rates, a positive shock to interest rates would cause a 
positive effect on private investment while the same effect is negative, according to the 
traditional theory, at higher rates. This theory suggests a nonlinear relationship between 
private investment and real interest rates with real interest rates describing the states of the 
economy. However, from the Venezuelan data we did not find evidence for using the real 
interest rate as a transition variable in a smooth transition logistic vector error correction 
(LSTVEC) model. Evidence was in favor of using lagged values of DLCREDIT as a transition 
variable. Under such a specification with two regimes – low credit and high credit – we have 
estimated the effects of shocks to changes in real interest rates, DRIQ, on the growth rate of 
private investment, DLPRIVINV. We should expect that in periods of credit contraction, a 
positive shock to real interest rates will have a positive effect on private investment. 
However, we did not find evidence for such an effect using Venezuelan data. In both regimes 
positive shocks to DRIQ have negative effects on DLPRIVINV, and this accumulated effect is 
more negative in the lower regime. Furthermore, the effect of positive shocks to DRIQ on 
DLPRIVINV is lower in absolute values than the response to negative shocks. Negative 
shocks to DRIQ on DLPRIVINV have a stronger cumulative effect when they start in the low 
regime.  
Despite the fact that we have found evidence for asymmetric effects between positive and 
negative shocks to DRIQ on DLPRIVINV, those results do not support McKinnon’s argument 
of positive shocks on DRIQ causing a rise in DLPRIVINV, even in periods of credit 
contraction. 
In addition, the Venezuelan data provides evidence for an asymmetric response of 
DLPRIVINV to shocks in DDLCREDIT for immediate periods after a negative shock to credit 
when the economy is already facing credit contractions, as was expected. On the other hand, 
the cumulative response of DLPRIVINV to positive shocks to DDLCREDIT becomes bigger 
in later periods when the high credit regime prevails. Why investment is more responsive to 
negative shocks to interest rates when facing credit contraction and more responsive to 
positive shocks to DDLCREDIT when facing credit expansion is difficult to explain.  
While the responses of the rate of growth of private investment to shocks to the rate of 
growth of private GDP and to its own shocks are symmetric, they emerge as the most 
important forces driving investment spending in the short run. 
Furthermore, the fact that the cointegrating vector does not enter into the private investment 
equation tells us that the opposite effect on DLPRIVINV of shocks to DLPUBINV is temporal. 
This is evidence that public investment acts as a substitute for private investment in the 
Venezuelan economy. Public investment has a negative effect on private investment when 
the government competes with the private sector to obtain the resources to finance 
investment projects or when it provides goods that can be produced by the private sector. 
Shocks to DLPUBINV of opposite effect on DLPRIVINV invite us to study the effects of public 
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